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CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER and RAWI ABDELAL
Harvard Business School
ABSTRACT
Recent decades have witnessed the remarkable rise of a kind of market
authority almost as centralized as the state itself – two credit rating
agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. These agencies derive their
influence from two sources. The first is the information content of their
ratings. The second is both more profound and vastly more problematic:
Ratings are incorporated into financial regulations in the United States
and around the world. In this article we clarify the role of credit rating
agencies in global capital markets, describe the host of problems that
arise when their ratings are given the force of law, and outline the
alternatives to the public policy dilemmas created when ratings receive a
public imprimatur. We conclude that agencies designated for regulatory
purposes should be required to provide more nuanced ratings exposing
their perceptual and ideological underpinnings (especially for sovereigns),
and facilitating consideration of alternatives to ratings-dependent
regulation.
[I]t is annexed to the sovereignty to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are
averse, and what conducing, to peace . . .
Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan
The only legitimate judge of the security policies of a state was, for
Thomas Hobbes, the state itself. The economic policies of states,
however, have always necessarily been judged by the market, an
abstraction universally understood as a collection of decentralized
individuals and firms. It is standard, even cliche´, to observe that political
economy is based on the tension between the centralized authority of the
government and the decentralized authority of the market. In this article
we explore the public policy answers to a vexing question: How should
governments respond when ‘ the market’ is no longer decentralized?
The post-war years have witnessed the remarkable rise of a kind
of market-based authority that is almost as centralized as the state
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itself – two credit rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s,
which are based in New York but have an increasingly global reach.
Through their ‘ opinions’ on the creditworthiness of debt issuers, includ-
ing sovereign governments, and the default risk associated with their
bonds, rating agencies exercise significant and increasing influence over
private capital movements (see Sinclair ). No sovereign government
would dare to issue debt without being rated by one or both of the
agencies. In fact, many sovereign governments have, without any
intention of issuing debt, sought a rating as a signal of transparency and
orthodoxy to the market and other governments.
The influence of the rating agencies has two sources. The first is
simply the information content of their ratings, which is a combination
of what Hall and Biersteker (a) describe as normative market
authority and the moral authority of the non-state, non-self interested
referee. The agencies’ assessments of the likelihood of default thus
derive, to a significant degree, from their objective analysis of the risks
associated with a collection of macroeconomic policies before the
backdrop of their subjective interpretation of the reigning orthodoxy.
This first source of power is increasingly well understood by those who
analyze the emergence of ‘ private authority’ in the world economy
(Cutler, Haufler, and Porter ; Hall and Biersteker b). The
agencies’ sovereign ratings indirectly affect every other bond rating in
the world because of the so-called ‘ sovereign ceiling’. With rare
exceptions, private-sector issuers of debt cannot have foreign-currency
credit ratings higher than their sovereign’s (Abdelal and Bruner a:
–).
The second source of the rating agencies’ power is both more profound
and vastly more problematic: Ratings are incorporated into financial
regulations in the United States, as well as in many other countries
around the world. A small number of rating agencies are literally, and
legally, the ‘ gatekeepers’ to the vast U.S. investing public. The U.S.
government thus has put these unregulated firms in the position to
express their interpretation of good economic policy to sovereign
governments through the process of rating them, and the sovereigns are
obliged to listen. EU countries have been on the receiving end of such
policy dictates, and European parliamentarians have grown resentful of
the perceived lack of understanding that the U.S.-based agencies have
shown toward differing accounting standards and corporate financing
customs. Ideas under consideration, on both sides of the Atlantic, include
two opposite paths – regulating the rating agencies or eliminating the
regulatory use of credit ratings altogether. Few policy makers seem to
prefer the status quo of making unregulated firms so fundamental to the
financial regulations that govern trillions of dollars worth of investments.
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The codification of this private authority has proven to be, at a
minimum, politically and socially unpalatable.
At the very moment that regulators in the United States and Europe
have undertaken investigations into the ratings industry, reevaluating
whether regulatory reliance on their opinions is either prudent or
politically sustainable, G central bankers and finance ministers have
been busy finalizing a vast extension of ratings-dependent codes through
the new capital adequacy rules for banks called ‘ Basel II’. Revisions of
national laws may be undoing the codification of the agencies’ influence
just as the new international standards for banking are poised to magnify
the effects of credit ratings. These contradictory drives underscore that
notwithstanding the practical and normative issues associated with
regulatory reliance on credit ratings, abandoning them is another matter
entirely.
Thus, the ‘ private’ authority of the rating agencies is not so private
after all. Governments have both valorized and codified their authority.
Indeed, governments define the market for ratings and help to determine
their influence. As John Ruggie observes, the scholarly literature has
overstated the process of regulatory privatization, ‘ obscuring the funda-
mental fact that in many instances of ‘ ‘ private governance’’ there has
been no actual shift away from public to private sectors’. Instead, Ruggie
observes, ‘ firms have created a new world of transaction flows that did
not exist previously’, and which could not have come into being without
a new ‘ global public domain’ of transnational discourse (Ruggie ,
–). This is true for the bond markets, which are based, argues
David Beers, Standard & Poor’s Global Head of Sovereign Ratings, on
a ‘ common language of credit risk that we at S&P helped to invent’
(quoted in Abdelal and Bruner a, ). The agencies created a new way
to talk about credit risk. Investors adopted it as a simple code through
which to describe and grapple with the uncertainties inherent in
investment. Regulators saw the agencies’ analysis as a straightforward,
putatively objective framework for the regulation of financial institutions’
exposure to credit risk. And issuers came to see the agencies as points of
access to international capital flows. But all of this happened not because
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s usurped the authority of states; instead,
the agencies created something new, and governments consented both
implicitly and explicitly.
In this paper we seek to clarify the role of credit rating agencies in
national and international capital markets, and to describe the host
of problems that arise when their ratings are given the force of law
through incorporation into financial and prudential regulation. We argue
that given the degree of reliance the markets and regulators place on
credit ratings, and the lack of clarity regarding workable market-based
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alternatives, a more measured approach to these problems should be
crafted and pursued, in place of the extreme responses currently
receiving attention. Agencies designated for regulatory purposes in the
United States (and elsewhere) should be required to provide ratings in a
more nuanced format that permits users to distinguish, to the extent
possible, between so-called ‘ quantitative’ aspects based on fundamental
economic analysis and so-called ‘ qualitative’ aspects flowing more
directly from the analyst’s perception and ideology. By augmenting the
informational value of ratings rather than abandoning them wholesale, a
number of practical and normative issues can be managed while
longer-term alternatives to ratings-dependent regulation are identified
and evaluated.
Credit ratings and private capital ﬂows
While various precursor institutions of the th Century provided
industrial reports and even information on the creditworthiness of
particular businesses, credit ‘ ratings’ as such were an innovation of the
early th Century, and specifically a response to modern industry and its
massive appetite for private capital. The precursors of today’s Moody’s
and Standard & Poor’s initially issued ratings solely for the debt
obligations of the railroads, which had catalyzed the development of a
global bond market to finance their expansion (Sylla : ).
Throughout their histories, the major credit rating agencies’ fortunes
have risen, fallen, and risen again in tandem with private capital
flows – initially within the United States, and later globally. From their
origin in  until about , as Richard Sylla has observed, the
agencies grew as the bond market expanded from railroad bonds to
include issues by utilities, manufacturers, and sovereign governments.
Investors used ratings to sift through the growing number of issues, and
the agencies were largely thought to have performed well, endeavoring to
establish and maintain strong reputations in a competitive environment
through ratings sold to subscribers (Sylla : –). After World War
II, however, the agencies declined in inverse proportion to growing
economic stability. By the early s the agencies employed few ratings
analysts and depended on research reports for revenues (Partnoy :
–).
The agencies’ spectacular expansion since the s has, again,
effectively mirrored the growth in private capital flows over recent
decades. Among the issuers that have taken part in the rapid expansion
of the global bond market are a growing number of sovereign govern-
ments. The agencies have depended, perhaps paradoxically, on some
instability in sovereign bond markets: Crises and defaults increase the
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potential value to investors of the agencies’ expertise at the same time
that they threaten to dry up the market or expose agencies to criticism.
Demand for sovereign credit ratings – particularly for high-yield,
speculative-grade emerging-market bonds – has increased substantially
since the early s, when so-called ‘ Brady bonds’ (essentially defaulted
emerging-market bank debt repackaged as bonds) ‘ whetted investor
appetites for high-yielding emerging markets securities, just as developing
countries coming out of their s recessions sought lower-cost, longer-
term alternatives to bank loans’ (Murphy ). Standard & Poor’s, for
instance, rated  sovereigns as of , virtually all of which were
investment grade, but by early  that number had grown to  with
an increasing number of speculative grade sovereigns, and by March
 had reached  with the help of a UN-funded program to
introduce sovereign ratings to sub-Saharan Africa (Chambers and Beers
; Beers ; S&P ). Moody’s issued  first-time sovereign
ratings between  and  to reach a total of  rated sovereigns
(Levey and Komanovskaya ). This trend reflects the fact that
sovereigns in some instances seek ratings not because they contemplate
debt issuances, but in order to communicate their commitment to
transparency and efforts to achieve stability, and thereby (hopefully)
to gain ‘ stamps of approval’ from international capital markets
(Vandemoortele ; also see Beers ).
The changing business model of rating agencies
The business model adopted by the rating agencies over recent decades
differs markedly from that in the period of their origin, as does their
position in today’s capital markets. Whereas credit ratings initially were
financed through subscription fees paid by investors, the dominant rating
agencies today derive their revenues principally from issuer fees, creating
an inherent conflict of interest that is only exacerbated, according to the
agencies’ critics, by the extension of the ratings franchise to the provision
of ancillary services (Morgenson ; Economist a; Economist b).
The agencies claim (very plausibly) that given the non-excludability
problem reflecting the ‘ public good’ nature of the product, issuer fees
(which in any event can be passed on to investors through lower returns)
are the only way to make credit rating a viable business (Partnoy ,
). Even reluctant issuers will likely choose to pay for a rating –
regardless of whether they wanted it – in order to have ‘ the opportunity
provided by the formal ratings process to put their best case before the
agencies’ (Cantor and Packer , ). The potential for abuse is
obvious, and the agencies have sought to defuse criticisms through
various internal processes and procedures, including merit-based pay for
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analysts and ‘ firewalls’ separating them from consulting work and fee
negotiations, asserting that reputational concerns are sufficient to check
such temptations (Smith and Walter , ; SEC a; Economist
a; Economist b).
A more fundamental difference in the ratings industry, however, has
resulted from financial disintermediation, and the increasingly central
role that a small number of prominent rating agencies have come to play
in capital markets as they step into the information-gathering role
previously played by banks. Traditionally banks have taken in money
from depositors (the banks’ creditors), and then lent it to borrowers based
on their own credit evaluations, and at their own risk. Since the s,
however, banks have been marginalized from this process as depositors
have put their money elsewhere and borrowers have found other sources
of capital (mutual funds, for instance). As banks have retooled to become
‘ active market participant[s]’, rating agencies have stepped in as infor-
mational intermediaries between those investing and those seeking
capital, giving them substantial influence over private capital flows
(Sinclair , , ; also see Sinclair ).
Finally, today’s ratings business differs markedly as a result of the
incorporation of credit ratings into financial and prudential regula-
tions, both in the United States and elsewhere. While regulators in the
United States have used credit ratings as benchmarks for limiting
exposure to credit risk since the early s, such regulatory use of
ratings has greatly expanded in scope and significance since the SEC
coined the concept of ‘ nationally recognized statistical rating organiz-
ations’, or NRSROs, in  (BIS , ; SEC a, –).
Effectively the SEC has recognized a small number of prominent rating
agencies as NRSROs based, among other things, on their having been
‘ nationally recognized’ in the United States as issuers of ‘ credible and
reliable ratings by the predominant users of securities ratings’, permitting
financial institutions to count such ratings toward compliance with the
wide range of regulations incorporating the concept (SEC a, ,
–). (As of March , the five NRSROs were Moody’s, Standard &
Poor’s, Fitch, Dominion Bond Rating Service Ltd., and A.M. Best
Company, Inc.) Similarly, the finance ministers and central bankers of
the G have, in part, built their revised capital adequacy rules, ‘ Basel
II’, upon credit ratings. In effect, banks not in a position to undertake
internal credit assessments (generally those with simpler loans and less
sophisticated control structures) may opt to comply with capital reserve
requirements based on ratings issued by so-called ‘ external credit
assessment institutions’, or ECAIs, identified by national supervisors
based on criteria roughly similar to the NRSRO designation criteria (BIS
a; BIS b, ).
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The ratings marketplace
The market for credit ratings might best be characterized as a duopoly-
plus-one (Smith and Walter , ). Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s,
often called the ‘ Big Two’, issue credit ratings on approximately U.S.$
trillion worth of securities each (King and Sinclair , ; Moody’s
Corporation , ). In the s, as demand for sovereign ratings
increased, both agencies established cooperative relationships with
numerous agencies in the developing world, and by the end of the s,
the Big Two accounted for % of the sovereign ratings market (Murphy
; Partnoy , ). Fitch is effectively a ‘ distant third’ with some
potential to achieve substantial market share, but presently lacks the
coverage and reputation to compete with the Big Two (King and Sinclair
, ). Numerous smaller players throughout the world are thought
to bring the total to approximately  to  credit rating agencies
worldwide (BIS , –).
While the Big Two emphasize their reputations and investor confi-
dence in their ratings, characterizing the market as a competitive one in
which issuers and users of ratings have simply voted with their feet, Fitch
has emphasized ‘ Moody’s and S&P’s power in the current market’,
charging that they constitute ‘ a dual monopoly, each possessing separate
monopoly power in a market that has grown to demand two ratings’, and
engaging in anticompetitive practices in areas of relative strength for
Fitch such as structured finance (O’Neill ; Moody’s Corporation
, –, ; Brown ). Indeed, some have argued that the
incorporation of ratings into financial regulation has so altered the
marketplace that the major incumbents effectively no longer rely on their
reputations with investors. The ‘ regulatory license’ hypothesis, as put
forth by Frank Partnoy, posits that ‘ credit ratings are valuable, not
because they contain valuable information, but because they grant
‘ regulatory licenses’ vouchsafing compliance. As a consequence, it is
argued, the major players flourish not because they enjoy strong
reputations in the marketplace, but because ratings-dependent regulation
creates artificial demand for their products, as evidenced by market
characteristics like the small number of dominant agencies and issuer-
based fee structures (Partnoy , –, –; also see White
; Kerwer ).
The ontology of credit ratings
Given the degree to which investors, banks, other financial institutions,
and their regulators – in fact, the entire global financial system – have
come to rely on credit ratings to address information asymmetries in the
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marketplace, ‘ greasing the wheels of capitalism’ by permitting investors
to part with their money more comfortably, there is a surprising lack of
awareness regarding what it is rating agencies actually do, and how they
do it (Sinclair , ).
The sovereign credit rating process for each of the Big Two is built
around the ‘ rating committee’, typically comprised of managing direc-
tors and analysts of varying backgrounds and levels of expertise (Beers
and Cavanaugh ; Hilderman ). Both Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s look to a number of economic and political criteria broadly
indicative of ‘ willingness’ and ‘ ability’ to repay debt obligations, while
emphasizing the centrality of ‘ qualitative’ (i.e., subjective) judgment
and the lack of any strict methodology (Beers and Cavanaugh ;
Hilderman , , ; Pinkes , ; Truglia , –). The ratings
themselves, assigned both to issuers and issues, are basically letter grades
establishing a relative hierarchy of creditworthiness. Typically a first-
time rating, once determined by the committee, is communicated to the
issuer, which may choose not to make it public, though there are
significant exceptions to this general rule (e.g., issuances into the U.S.
market) (Murray , –).
Standard & Poor’s rating process is broadly representative. Once a
sovereign seeking a rating has entered a formal agreement with Standard
& Poor’s and forwarded preliminary economic and financial data, a team
of two or more analysts visits the country for three to four days to meet
with finance ministry and central bank representatives (including top
officials), as well as a range of constituencies outside the government
thought to be knowledgeable on politics and economic policy. The
analysts then prepare for the rating committee a report including a
suggested rating and rationale, which the committee assesses through a
number of quantitative and qualitative lenses representative of ‘ economic
risk’ (the sovereign’s ability to repay) and ‘ political risk’ (the sovereign’s
willingness to repay). There is ‘ no exact formula’ through which such
considerations factor into the eventual rating (see Abdelal and Bruner
b).
Actual committee discussion remains the ‘ invisible ingredient in the
ratings process’ across the agencies, though reportedly it ‘ often center[s]
around intangible issues such as a government’s propensity for ‘ ortho-
dox’ vs. ‘ heterodox’ policy responses when under acute debt-service
pressure’. It is thought that the ‘ heavy workload . . . may result in an
element of piggybacking’ on the work of other institutions, including ‘ the
IMF, academia, investment banks, and – conceivably – other rating
agencies’, and ‘ key inputs’ in the analysis of domestic politics include
the likes of ‘ the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Reports and
Country Proﬁles, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index,
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and Freedom House’s list of ‘ true democracies’ (Bhatia , , –,
).
Given the highly subjective nature of credit rating – especially with
sovereigns, for which politics and willingness to repay are of special
concern (Beers and Cavanaugh ; Truglia, Levey, and Mahoney
, –) – it follows that the process is permeated by ideologically
conditioned judgments. Numerous observers, particularly those from
outside the United States, have argued that despite their objective
posture, the major agencies’ credit ratings reflect a U.S.-centric, liberalist
ideology (Murphy ; Kerwer , ; Sinclair , –;
Subramanian ). For instance, while a sovereign rating will inevitably
reflect the analyst’s general perception of political stability and institu-
tional transparency, Standard & Poor’s looks more specifically at whether
governmental ‘ separation of powers’ and ‘ civil institutions, particularly
an independent press’, have developed such that ‘ policy errors’ can be
‘ identified and corrected’ quickly (Beers and Cavanaugh ). Standard
& Poor’s also favors ‘ a market economy with legally enforceable property
rights’ as ‘ less prone to policy error’ (Beers and Cavanaugh ).
Of course rating agencies are far from unique in permitting their
ideological and cultural preconceptions to permeate the transactions in
which they engage (Sassen , ), and in any event, while undoubt-
edly reflective of a particular ideology, few (at least in the West) will query
the general wisdom of encouraging the dispersal of political power, a free
and vigorous press, meaningful property rights, and an efficient market-
place. More troubling is the implied litmus test – that countries that have
gotten this right will be identifiable because they will not make ‘ policy
errors’. Standard & Poor’s description of the sorts of characteristics that
are generally observed in countries at various rungs on the ratings ladder
begins to illuminate what this might mean. Sovereigns in higher ratings
categories tend to exhibit ‘ [o]penness to trade and integration into the
global financial system’, with economic policies that, in general, are
‘ cautious, flexible, and market-oriented’, indicating that ‘ orthodox
market-oriented economic programs are generally well established’.
Lower-rated sovereigns, on the other hand, place ‘ more restrictions’ on
trade and investment, and ‘ [o]rthodox economic policies are usually not
well established’ (Cavanaugh ).
The concept of an ‘ orthodoxy’ is certainly evocative, but little in the
way of substance is provided beyond affirmation of the liberalist
commitment to openness. In essence, ‘ orthodoxy’, as used by Standard
& Poor’s in its methodological literature, appears simply to be a positive
term describing the absence of ‘ policy errors’ associated with a lack of
openness. Standard & Poor’s emphasis on policy in its ratings, and in
other communications to sovereigns, provides some confirmation of this.
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Following the Asian financial crisis, Standard & Poor’s made eminently
clear to bruised emerging markets that their ‘ policy reactions . . ., more
so than any new IMF-led support packages’, would be ‘ key to their credit
standing’, just as the appropriateness of policies undertaken during the
crisis had determined ‘ the rating actions that Standard & Poor’s [had]
taken in response to them’ (Beers et al. ). Malaysia, for instance, did
not default, though it pursued the ‘ less disruptive but still damaging’
policy of imposing capital controls, contrary to the preference for
openness (Beers et al. ; also see Abdelal and Alfaro ). The degree
to which this actually constituted ‘ error’ remains questionable, and in
any event, Standard & Poor’s has since backpedaled on the question of
capital controls, as has Moody’s (Beers and Cavanaugh ; Mahoney
, ). The fact remains, however, that whether the judgment was
right or wrong, Malaysia’s cost of borrowing went up when their
sovereign rating was downgraded.
It is not surprising that, in many cases, ‘ policy errors’ can be very
difficult to identify with any certainty, and that in such cases they are
more or less in the eye of the beholder. Of course Standard & Poor’s is
not alone; Moody’s later conceded that it had ‘ indulged’ in a ‘ blame the
borrower’ response to the Asian financial crisis, and observed that ‘ if the
true causes of the crisis have been misdiagnosed, then the prescriptions
for remediation may be wrong as well’ (Mahoney , , ; Byrne et
al. , ). Predictably, where matters are highly ‘ qualitative’ and
‘ subjective’, as they are with sovereign credit ratings, what is deemed
‘ policy error’ will turn largely on who gets to speak. This is not to suggest
that credit ratings are themselves in error all or even much of the time,
but rather that the essence of a credit rating lies not so much in what is
said, but in who said it. Put differently, the significance of a rating in
today’s global economy derives not from the ideas or information
conveyed so much as from the various social, financial, and legal
institutions that favor dominant agencies’ opinions by hinging various
financial and regulatory consequences on their ratings.
That this is so is supported by a growing body of empirical evidence on
determinants and relative timing of sovereign credit ratings. One notable
study by Richard Cantor and Frank Packer argued, for instance, that
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s sovereign ratings ‘ can be explained by
a small number of well-defined’ economic variables, ‘ which the two
agencies appear to weigh similarly’ (Cantor and Packer , , ).
This study also found evidence suggesting that ‘ [a]gency announcements
of a change in sovereign risk assessments appear to be preceded by a
similar change in the market’s assessment of sovereign risk’, but that
‘ [c]ontrary to our expectations, . . . market anticipation does not reduce
significantly, if at all, the impact of a sovereign rating announcement’
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(Cantor and Packer , , ). Put differently, the agencies often
simply tell the market what it already knows, and yet their ‘ announce-
ments’ continue to have impact. The authors of this study conclude that
‘ sovereign ratings effectively summarize and supplement the information
contained in macroeconomic indicators’, though it is unclear what this
‘ supplement’ might consist of beyond the major agencies’ confirmation
(at best) or regurgitation (at worst) of established market perception
(Cantor and Packer , ).
This pattern is most troubling in the days preceding and following a
major financial crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, for instance, has argued that
‘ excessive liberalization is systematically related to a higher probability of
crisis’, and that ‘ ideology, rather than science’ has dictated economic
development strategies over recent decades (Stiglitz , ; also see
Stiglitz , ; Stiglitz , xiv). Stiglitz and colleagues G. Ferri and
L.G. Liu have also argued that before and after the Asian financial crisis
the ‘ rating agencies attached higher weights to their qualitative judgment
than they gave to the economic fundamentals’ (Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz
, ). More specifically, they argued that Indonesia, South Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand received ratings before the crisis that were
‘ consistently higher than the economic fundamentals would warrant’,
and ratings following the crisis that ‘ dropped much more sharply’ than
such fundamentals required. Stiglitz and his colleagues speculated that
the agencies had downgraded these sovereigns all the more harshly after
the crisis in an effort to ‘ protect their reputation capital’, having largely
failed to see the crisis coming (Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz , , ,
–). Such results, taken together with the empirical data on
economic determinants of sovereign ratings, sketch an interesting com-
posite picture. In general, these studies suggest, sovereign ratings
summarize basic economic data that the market already possesses. At
extreme high and low points of the economic cycle, however, such as the
emerging-market euphoria of the mid-s and the crash that followed,
the agencies’ ‘ qualitative’ judgment takes over as they follow the market
upward, and then scramble to react when the bottom falls out. Moody’s,
in particular, has strenuously objected to these charges (Amin-Salem
et al. , ).
Increasing scrutiny
In most markets none of this would constitute a particularly damaging
indictment. Predicting the future is difficult in the extreme, and firms
make mistakes. Usually, when firms make very large mistakes, market
discipline is unforgiving. Clearly, however, the market for ratings is
different. Ratings are incorporated into regulation; right or wrong, they
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cannot be ignored by regulated investors. This reality has been brought
home to regulators in the United States not, however, by emerging
market crises, but by Enron and other spectacular corporate bankrupt-
cies of the new millennium (Sinclair , –; Subramanian ).
In the wake of such scandals, Congress predictably held hearings on the
agencies’ role (noting Enron’s investment grade status just days before its
bankruptcy was announced), and through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
 instructed the SEC to review the industry. The SEC, which had, in
vain, proposed in  that a more structured NRSRO designation
process be implemented, requested comments from the public regarding
‘ the appropriate degree of regulatory oversight that should be applied to
credit rating agencies’ and whether the NRSRO concept should be
modified or eliminated altogether – a move that could entail a wholesale
rethinking of the regulation of credit risk (SEC ; SEC b). Some,
for instance, have argued that something more market-based and
objective (e.g., credit spreads) be used to eliminate the problems created
by the use of credit ratings (Partnoy , ), though concerns remain
regarding the volatility of market-based measures (Mahoney ).
The Big Two actually fell on opposite sides of the NRSRO question,
with Standard & Poor’s in favor of keeping the concept and Moody’s
urging that it be eliminated (O’Neill ; Corbet ; McDaniel ;
McDaniel ). Setting aside the merits of the question, one might have
thought that the interests of the Big Two would be identical, given their
dominance and widespread demand for two ratings. Moody’s has, in fact,
quite candidly observed that ‘ as private, profit-oriented entities’, agencies
‘ will not ignore invitations and inducements to enter markets’, but that
where, as in the United States, ‘ growth in demand for ratings is not only
due to natural market forces, but due to artificial demand for ratings and
rating agencies mandated by regulation’, ratings no longer function as
opinions to be taken or left by investors, and market discipline is
accordingly sacrificed (Pinkes , , , ). Standard & Poor’s, on the
other hand, has taken the view that ‘ the wholesale withdrawal of the
NRSRO concept could be costly to market participants which are subject
to such regulations and disruptive to the market’ (O’Neill ; also see
Corbet ). The Big Two clearly face a difficult cost-benefit problem.
Standard & Poor’s position is consistent with recognition of the decrease
in revenues that might well result from elimination of the NRSRO
concept, while Moody’s position is consistent with recognition of the
potential for increased scrutiny of the ratings industry – and even direct
regulation – already clearly on the minds of Congress and the SEC.
Indeed in February  the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs (the Senate Banking Committee) convened
a hearing on the agencies, noting that they ‘ wield extraordinary power in
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the marketplace’, acknowledging the view that the NRSRO concept ‘ has
evolved into a quasi-official stamp of market credibility that acts as a
barrier to entry’, and expressly seeking to ‘ address the potential for
conflicts in this industry’ (Shelby ). The SEC has also revived its
attempt to clarify the ‘ NRSRO’ concept, introduce procedural transpar-
ency and reduce barriers to entry, voting at its March ,  open
meeting to move forward with a new rule proposal that would (among
other things) explicitly permit sector-specific NRSRO designation, while
retaining the circular market acceptance requirement (Donaldson a;
Nazareth ).
Numerous references were made in both of these settings to conflicts of
interest (see Shelby ; Stabenow ; Egan ; Goldschmid ),
perhaps reflecting a rational likening of credit rating to financial auditing,
an activity similarly rife with potential conflicts (and in which private-
sector judgments, incidentally, are similarly ensconced in regulation). At
the same time, this preoccupation may reflect the regulator’s pragmatic
focus on an issue more easily identified, described, and resolved than are
the more fundamental problems arising from regulatory incorporation of
credit ratings. Many – even the pro-market Economist – have advocated
additional regulation of the agencies (Economist a). As observed by
one SEC Commissioner desirous of greater ‘ diligence’ in the agencies’
work, however, even if Congress were to grant the SEC broad oversight
authority with respect to the agencies, such a regime would likely be
‘ compromised’ by protections afforded the agencies under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (i.e. as nominal journalists), which
might ‘ place the SEC in the same situation that it is in today’ (Atkins
). Conflicts of interest, on the other hand – regardless of the efficacy
of the agencies’ internal policies and procedures to address them, and
regardless of the public good rationale for issuer fees – present regulators
unable to contemplate abandoning ratings-dependent regulation, and yet
unable effectively to regulate the agencies themselves, with an easily
grasped alternative problem that is already on the public’s mind (see
Morgenson ; Economist a; Economist b), and for which a set
of recently minted responses (post-Enron) already exists.
The situation elsewhere is complicated by the agencies’ perceived lack
of cultural awareness. In Asia, the major rating agencies have met fierce
resistance, due in large part to a perceived lack of understanding of
‘ Asian business practices’ (Sinclair , ). The agencies have
encountered similar problems with sovereigns, as in Japan where
sovereign downgrades have been ‘ dismissed’ as ‘ nothing but interfer-
ence’ and ‘ unnecessary meddling’ (Sinclair , , quoting Financial
Services Minister Hakuo Yangisawa) driven by application of the
U.S.-based agencies’ ‘ home standards’ (Sinclair , , quoting
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Kurosawa Yoshitaka of Nihon University). Given such views, the move to
develop domestic agencies is unsurprising (as is their tendency to rate
Asian companies higher than do their foreign counterparts), though their
global expansion has been limited, at least in part, by their inability to
achieve NRSRO status (Japan Center for International Finance ;
Harada ). In China, meanwhile, regulators have sought to foster
industry standards as a means of combating high levels of corruption in
the credit ratings business (some ‘ pct of credit rating agencies’
businesses’ reportedly being ‘ connected to companies seeking banking
loans’) (XFN News ; also see AFX Asia ).
European critics have likewise argued that ‘ Europe doesn’t have a
major rating agency that would take into account the special character-
istics of European accounting or the prevailing differences in financial
ratios as they evolved in a bank-based financial system’, and sovereigns
not amenable to foreign criticism have found themselves in the agencies’
cross hairs on important issues of domestic policy (Engelen ;
Kraemer and Marchand ; Sinclair , –). European parlia-
mentarians have increasingly complained about industry concentration,
the U.S.-centric orientation of the major agencies, the ‘ protectionist
overtones’ of the NRSRO system, and the fact that ‘ European capital
markets are faced with the prospect of an ever-increasing use of
rating assessments for business and for regulatory purposes’ (European
Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs , –). A
European Parliament report (not adopted by the full Parliament, no
doubt to the agencies’ relief) blasted the agencies, arguing that ‘ the
predominantly American character of the agencies and of their super-
visors (i.e., the SEC and Congress) creates a vast de facto imbalance
toward the American side’, that Europe needs a regulatory body to
oversee the agencies, and that ‘ the effective duopoly of the two main
agencies has to be confronted by means of a possible break-up . . . along
lines of specialisation’ (European Parliament Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs , –; also see The Banker ). While not yet
ready to go this far, the European Parliament has directed the European
Commission to report back by July  with its views on regulation of
the agencies (European Parliament resolution on Role and Methods of
Rating Agencies [/(INI)]). The Commission, in turn, looked to
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) for advice, in
response to which the CESR endorsed the voluntary code of conduct
published by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions in
December . CESR members largely favored a ‘ wait and see’
approach, but concluded that ‘ [s]hould self regulation fail to deliver,
there might be a need for statutory regulation’ (CESR ). In any
event, the message is clear. In the words of a German finance official,
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Jochen Sanio, the agencies are ‘ uncontrolled world powers that are
directing global capital flows’ (quoted in Engelen ) – a state of affairs
that Europe is unwilling to live with in the long run.
Notwithstanding all of these criticisms, however, a number of national
governments are perpetuating a striking contradiction. At the same time
that legislative and regulatory bodies in the United States and the
European Union question the appropriateness of incorporating rating
agency opinions into regulation, their own central bankers and finance
ministers are embarking on a massive expansion of ratings-dependent
regulation in the form of Basel II’s ‘ standardised approach’ to bank
capital adequacy. The lack of clarity on alternative structures, and the
simultaneous criticism of and increasing reliance upon credit ratings,
reflect the degree to which governments and investors have grown
dependent on these private-sector entities, whose work and role in global
capital markets remain, at best, dimly understood.
The ratings business, meanwhile, is as profitable as ever, and presum-
ably can only benefit from the new terrain that Basel II opens to it.
Standard & Poor’s was a ‘ key growth driver’ in  for McGraw-Hill
(the publishing company of which it is a division), bringing in revenue of
approximately U.S.$. billion (over % of McGraw-Hill’s revenue) and
approximately U.S.$. million in profit (over % of McGraw-Hill’s
profit) (McGraw Hill Companies , , , –). Moody’s also did
well in , reporting approximately U.S.$. billion in revenue (over
% of consolidated revenue of Moody’s Corporation, the rating
agency’s parent), and approximately U.S.$. million in operating
income (over % of consolidated operating income) (Moody’s
Corporation , –, –). Though the Big Two are ‘ reluctant to
discuss specific fees charged for ratings’, their fees have been estimated to
range from U.S.$, up to U.S.$, (or approximately – basis
points on the issue).
Opinions, standards, and rules
It is widely recognized that Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s today wield
remarkable power, as ‘ gatekeepers’ to capital markets, over sovereign
and private issuers alike (Kerwer ; Sinclair , ). And yet
ironically, this is incompatible with the agencies’ own views regarding
how ratings should be used in arriving at investment decisions. The
agencies continually emphasize that a rating is just an ‘ opinion’, that it
is a relative rather than absolute measure of credit risk, and that as such,
a rating is only one of many variables that an investor should consider
before arriving at a decision to buy, sell or hold a debt security. In
Moody’s view, ‘ informed investors who come to their own conclusions
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about credit quality make more effective use of ratings in managing
financial risk’, and ‘ the probability of default is only one factor that
investors legitimately consider in making their decisions to lend’ (Turner
, ). This view makes sense enough in the abstract. However,
real-world institutional investors whose hands are forced by rating
changes across the all-important ‘ investment grade’ line, and sovereigns
whose policymaking discretion is greatly curtailed by the need to please
foreign, largely unregulated private-sector entities, know better (SEC
a; Sinclair ; King and Sinclair ; European Parliament
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ; Subramanian
).
The difference between the ideal and the reality is the functional
difference between ‘ standards’ and ‘ rules’. The agencies present their
ratings as ‘ opinions’ that investors can take or leave. When the SEC in
 requested comments on the need to regulate rating agencies,
Standard & Poor’s emphasized that generating a rating involves ‘ the
forming of opinions about that issuer or security and the broad
dissemination of those opinions to the public’, activities ‘ highly akin to
those regularly performed by professional journalists’ (which charac-
terization opens a strong First Amendment defense against intrusive
regulation and civil liability) (O’Neill ). Likewise Moody’s stressed
that ‘ ratings are predictive opinion forecasts about an uncertain future,
not statements of fact’ (and on this basis has opposed ‘ any supervision
processes that would impair existing Constitutional, federal or state
law protections designed to mitigate our exposure’ to subpoenas and
litigation) (McDaniel ).
Few would contest that ratings originally performed as the agencies
describe. Ideally, ratings serve as ‘ signposts’ for investors in vast and
complex markets, constituting a simplified vocabulary and conceptual
framework through which to talk about credit risk (Kerwer , ).
This is the sense in which rating agencies have been described as
‘ standard setters’; their ratings opinions, in the aggregate, create a
nonbinding ‘ common understanding of what constitutes credit-
worthiness’, and in this respect represent ‘ advice given to many’ deriving
force from ‘ the legitimacy of the underlying expertise’ (Kerwer , ).
The agencies ‘ vet and judge practices’, thereby ‘ narrow[ing] the
expectations of creditors and debtors to a certain well-understood or
transparent set that is shared among themselves’ (Sinclair , ; King
and Sinclair , –). The check on the agencies’ power, in this
ideal scenario, is the need to preserve their reputations. That is, they are
permitted to play this standard setting role only to the degree that they
have earned investors’ trust through performance of their ratings over
time as predictors of default.
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This balance is thrown off, however, when the ‘ standards’ become
‘ rules’, as when legislative and regulatory bodies incorporate them into
regulations, imbuing them with the force of law. Regulatory use of ratings
compromises the exertion of market discipline upon rating agencies both
directly and indirectly. First, market discipline is reduced directly
through the creation of artificial demand for the ratings of designated
agencies as investors seek to satisfy regulatory requirements. (While the
empirical evidence on this point is mixed [Steiner and Heinke , ;
Cantor and Packer , ], Moody’s itself acknowledges this to be
the case [Pinkes , ].) When regulatory compliance hinges on credit
ratings, regulated investors have no option but to follow them (Kerwer
, ; Partnoy , ). Second, market discipline is reduced
indirectly to the extent that agency designation requirements for ratings-
dependent regulation constitute a barrier to entry into the ratings market,
insulating incumbents from potential competitors (Kerwer , ;
Partnoy , ). Both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have in fact
expressed support for a more transparent NRSRO designation process,
though this may simply reflect confidence that their near total market
dominance is effectively unassailable, and/or recognition that in light of
the danger of substantive regulation of agencies, the added competition
of a few more NRSROs is the least of their worries (O’Neill ;
McDaniel ).
Private actors and public power
This dynamic of private-sector actors wielding de facto government power
is neither new nor unique. An extensive body of scholarship has
examined, for instance, the various roles that ‘ networks of knowledge-
based experts’, sometimes called ‘ epistemic communities’, have played in
policymaking, particularly with respect to conditioning ‘ the manner in
which problems are understood by the policymakers or are represented
by those to whom they turn for advice under conditions of uncertainty’
(Haas , –). The ‘ epistemic’ concept has been employed to explain
‘ the authority exercised by [rating] agencies and its relationship to
knowledge’, the point being, as Timothy Sinclair () puts it, that ‘ they
do not seek to persuade, but to make judgments’. While in theory this
‘ epistemic authority’ to judge rests on market perception, and thus could
be lost if the market turned on them, such authority ‘ is, by its very nature,
hard to budge, as others are likely to discount the ‘ mistakes’ or epistemic
failures of the agencies, given their stock of eminence’ (Sinclair , ).
A key difference, however, between the ‘ epistemic community’ as
traditionally conceptualized, and credit rating agencies, is that the
epistemic community tends more to inform and influence policy decisions
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that ultimately are taken by government officials, whereas rating agencies
have effectively been deputized to make decisions themselves that have
direct policy consequences. Perhaps a more apt theoretical approach
would be that of so-called ‘ coordination service firms’ – that is, ‘ firms
that operate to coordinate the behaviour of other firms’, of which
additional examples would include ‘ multinational law, accounting,
management, and insurance firms, stock exchanges . . . and financial
clearinghouses’ (Cutler , ; also see Sinclair , , ).
However, this concept similarly fails to illuminate the dynamics of
regulatory infusion of public power into erstwhile private-sector judg-
ments (even though this phenomenon may manifest itself through a
number of types of coordination service firms). Crucially, when a rating
agency downgrades a security to speculative grade, the agency has
effectively commanded certain regulated investors to sell. And when an
agency revises its methodology to judge and characterize credit risk in a
new way, this decision is essentially given automatic effect through
pre-existing regulatory recognition.
While rating agencies may have initially gained prominence as
purveyors of expert knowledge, the current degree of authority they
exercise over the flow of global capital reflects, to some degree, the
changing regulatory role of domestic governments in an age of financial
globalization. The rating agencies’ relationship with sovereigns is not best
understood in terms of relative power – which they have gained and lost.
Rather, this aspect of what Ruggie calls the ‘ global public domain’ is
wholly new. Governments – particularly the U.S. government, but also
the G representatives meeting in Basel – have deputized the rating
agencies. Public authority has not been privatized. Indeed, it is just the
reverse: Private authority that emerged spontaneously, and which
previously had no public counterpart, has been given public standing
through laws and codes.
That powerful sovereigns like the United States have not exercised
direct authority in the market is therefore not an accommodation of the
inevitable. These were decisions, often made with a purpose. It undoubt-
edly remains true that ‘ governments routinely obfuscate their final
authority in financial markets’ in an ‘ intentional effort to render opaque
political responsibility’ for difficult decisions (Pauly , ). There are
at least two ways in which declining to undertake direct market
regulation through the use of ratings-dependent rules benefits U.S.
policymakers. First, increased latitude for private-sector actors to pursue
international transactions freely has meant the dissemination of U.S.-
centric standards globally. New York-based Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s are, ironically, in a position to tell other governments what to do
and how to conduct their economic policies in a blunt vocabulary
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unavailable to the U.S. government. These private-sector injunctions are
lent far greater force when incorporated into regulations, forcing U.S.
institutional investors to act upon the agencies’ assessments of the policies
pursued by other sovereigns, withdrawing funds (and raising the cost of
borrowing) when those policies are frowned upon. Second, the use of
credit ratings in financial and other regulations permits policymakers to
distance themselves from domestic political fallout when the regulation of
credit risk goes awry. When Enron collapsed with no warning from the
rating agencies, capping a series of perceived failures including several
global financial crises in the s, Congress and the SEC could call
hearings, investigate, and berate the agencies, querying whether ratings-
dependent regulation makes sense in the future, without digging too
deeply into whether incorporating them in the past was simply a bad
decision in the first place (SEC a).
This disjuncture between authority and responsibility creates what
Dieter Kerwer (, ) has called an ‘ accountability gap’. Ratings
opinions are characterized by the agencies as standards, which the user
can take or leave. The user is responsible, however, ‘ since per definition
the adoption of a standard is voluntary’ (Kerwer , ). When a
standard is given the force of law through government enforcement,
however, the standard setter arguably should be treated as a rule setter,
with full accountability for what has effectively become a rule. When this
does not happen, ‘ the standard setter acquires power by third-party
enforcement, which is not checked by corresponding accountability’ –
hence the gap (Kerwer , ). It should also be observed, however,
that deputizing a standard setter in this way creates a corresponding
‘ accountability gap’ in government as well. Policymakers get to make
rules, but dodge responsibility for them, by piggy-backing on the
decisions of others, whom they can blame when things go wrong.
Congress and the SEC cannot be held accountable because they are not
the author of the rule content, only the rule framework; they relied on the
‘ experts’ to get the substance right (Kerwer , –). Likewise, the
rating agencies cannot be held accountable because while they may have
authored the content, they never asked to have a rule framework built
around it; they are purveyors of ‘ opinion’, self-proclaimed journalists
with a ready made First Amendment defense against civil liability and
regulatory intrusion into their operations.
Dealing with uncertainty
To be sure, regulating something as abstract as credit risk exposure is far
from straightforward. Whereas policymakers encounter forms of uncer-
tainty in the process of arriving at all kinds of concrete policy initiatives,
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in the case of credit risk, uncertainty is the very object of policy itself.
Obviously investment, and regulation thereof, are inherently forward
looking, and therefore uncertain. While investment is greatly facilitated
by the reduction of uncertainty, however, it cannot be eliminated;
Moody’s itself has stressed that for ‘ ratings and credit analysis to be
effective indicators of risk, markets must operate so that investors really
are at risk of loss, and know it’ (Turner , ). This is not really the
fundamental problem, however, because even if investors understand
that there is an inherent remainder of uncertainty in any measure of
credit risk (which must be true, or it would not be risk), they generally still
assume that the basis for credit ratings is fundamentally sound and
meaningful. This capacity to view a complex world through a simple set
of comparative symbols is the rating agency’s stock in trade – it is what
a rating agency sells to investors (or at least used to, in the days of
subscription-based fees). It is crucial to observe that the apparent
reduction of complexity through credit ratings both conveys information
and elides it. Whatever information a credit rating may convey to the
market, it also undoubtedly permits semi-willful ignorance of the full
measure of uncertainty inherent in investment. To the extent that credit
ratings’ ‘ very existence increases the investors’ risk appetite’ – based at
least in part on faith in the process of their production – the agencies are
‘ absorbing uncertainty for investors, making unpleasant surprises about
credit risk more likely’ (Kerwer , ). For agencies to criticize
investors for ‘ accept[ing] the rating symbol as an absolute value and
apply[ing] it as an investment criteria without questioning the rationale’
(Turner , ) is perhaps hypocritical when – setting aside the wisdom
of doing so – the very selling point of the letter-grade system is the
economy of thought it invites.
The simplicity of the letter-grade system is likewise undoubtedly the
root of its attractiveness as a regulatory tool, as evidenced by extensive
use in the United States through the NRSRO concept, and its recent
incorporation into worldwide prudential regulation of banks through the
Basel II framework. Couple this with the dual-incentive for U.S.
policymakers to dodge political accountability for the regulation of credit
risk, while augmenting the capacity of private-sector institutions to
enforce U.S.-centric governance norms abroad, and the pull of credit
ratings as a regulatory tool is all but inescapable.
Thus, the government and the agencies appear to have come to a tacit
understanding, which is increasingly under threat. Rating agencies get
rule-like enforcement of their nominal standards, the accompanying
market demand for their product, insulation from methodological
scrutiny (through the absence of direct regulation), and a shield from civil
liability (through the absence of any serious challenge to their status as
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nominal First Amendment ‘ journalists’). In exchange, the agencies offer
themselves as a repository for residual uncertainty associated with credit
risk (that might otherwise temper investor confidence and expose
policymakers to the discipline of democratic accountability), accept
(limited) reputational liability when things go wrong, and enforce an
implicit U.S.-centric, neo-liberal ideology around the world (upon private
and sovereign issuers alike) as gatekeepers to the U.S. investing public.
This unspoken quid pro quo depends on the dissociation of power and
accountability, and the dissociation of reputation and market demand.
Both result in large part from the incorporation of credit ratings into
regulation.
Conclusions: Opening up the ratings
We have identified at least three serious drawbacks of the current
relationship between public and private authority in the bond markets.
First, sovereign governments, particularly in emerging markets, have
seen their policy making discretion curtailed as affluent countries’
regulators decline to undertake direct financial and prudential regulation,
effectively augmenting the authority of unaccountable firms to define – or
at least reproduce – the terms of orthodox economic policy making.
Second, non-sovereign issuers of debt effectively must, like sovereigns,
seek out ratings from an artificially narrowed set of dominant agencies in
order to tap international capital flows. Third, regulated investors, and
the fund managers acting on their behalf, are being forced by the
codification of the rating agencies’ role in the markets to adjust their
portfolios based on judgments that imply a much greater reduction in
uncertainty than can really be the case.
These are consequences that flow quite directly from the enforcement
of simplistic letter-grade credit ratings through financial and prudential
regulatory rules. As an increasing body of critics – private and public
sector alike – are recognizing, the costs of such a regulatory approach
may well be exceeding the benefits. There are good reasons to think very
seriously about reconnecting power with accountability, and reputation
with actual market demand.
The most obvious remedies would be either to replace credit ratings in
regulation with a more market-based measure, or to keep the credit
ratings but regulate the agencies. Both have their advocates and their
detractors. Removal of ratings would force regulators to arrive at some
alternative measure of credit risk through the typical rule-making
process. Presumably the views of various ‘ expert’ communities would be
solicited and considered in an open and democratic manner, with a final
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determination of a more market-based measure settled upon by govern-
ment itself. The Big Two would be freed from the specter of government
regulation of their operations, but also denied the benefit of government-
enforced demand for their products. The empirical literature on credit
ratings presents a range of options worthy of consideration. Were the
agencies themselves to be regulated, the methodological ‘ black box’ –
only dimly understood notwithstanding the major agencies’ publications
on ratings criteria – would be opened up, its contents scrutinized, the
true nature and extent of uncertainty reduction made more clear, and its
ideological biases opened for discussion.
To the extent that either or both of these options prove politically or
(in the case of agency regulation) legally impossible, a better, simpler, and
more realistic near-term solution might be simply to mandate bifurcation
of the so-called ‘ quantitative’ and ‘ qualitative’ aspects of NRSRO credit
ratings, while retaining both. In addition to credit ratings as currently
issued by the agencies, reflecting the full range of quantitative and
qualitative considerations, an additional quantitative-only rating could be
issued. While it is undoubtedly true that ‘ qualitative and judgmental
aspects of analysis are unavoidable even in the interpretation of quanti-
tative indicators’ (Levey , ), empirical research demonstrating the
predictive capacity and, in some circumstances, the superiority, of
defined economic ‘ fundamentals’ (Cantor and Packer ; Ferri,
Liu and Stiglitz ) suggests that a practical bifurcation could be
undertaken.
The normative and practical advantages of such an approach over the
status quo are substantial. The full benefit of the analyst’s expertise would
be retained, while the black box would be opened at least enough to allow
users of ratings to discern what a given agency’s conception of the
quantitative fundamentals actually is, and how much a given overall
rating is affected by the analyst’s unavoidably ideological, qualitative
analysis of factors like ‘ political risk’ – achievable through simple sub-
traction, even in the absence of any coherent statement of principles
guiding qualitative analysis. This approach sacrifices nothing, as the
presently conceived overall rating would be retained, but more infor-
mation would be provided in the form of greater nuance, in much the
same way that it was when numerical modifiers were introduced to
differentiate relative credit risk within a letter-grade category (Kliger and
Sarig , ). Investors would get a more objective picture of an
issuer or an issue, plus the overall picture as refracted through the
analyst’s perceptions, helping to combat the complacent assumption
that uncertainty has been reduced more than it really has, and provid-
ing additional information from which to determine absolute – as
opposed to relative – credit risk. Sovereigns subject to the agencies’
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policy prescriptions would be armed with additional information through
which to assess their own economic circumstances, and a more nuanced
sense of the agencies’ ideological perspectives. Such an approach would
also facilitate regulatory consideration of alternatives to ratings-
dependent regulation through increased disclosure of the agencies’
methodological thinking – and avoid the more obvious political and legal
complications associated with regulating the actual substance of agency
analysis.
Even the staunchest critics of the rating agencies tend to recognize that
identifying the flaws in the present system is far easier than working out
solutions. Though the long-term benefits of reducing or eliminating
regulatory dependence on credit ratings would be substantial, there is of
course a danger of throwing out the baby with the bath water; hasty
action could result in settling upon a market-based measure of credit risk
that fails to out-perform credit ratings, thereby damaging already fragile
investor confidence. A primary virtue of the bifurcated ratings model
advocated here is that it is information-augmenting.
At present, movement on these issues remains tentative at best because
the stakes are high and the answers are far from obvious. It is time to
consider a more gradual approach to reducing regulatory dependence on
credit ratings, a goal that might best be achieved by opening up the
ratings themselves.
NOTES
. For insightful comments on previous drafts of this paper, we thank Jonathan Kirshner, Debora Spar,
Richard Vietor, Louis Wells, David Yoffie, and two anonymous reviewers. We are grateful to
Harvard Business School’s Division of Research and Faculty Development for supporting this
project.
. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
Inc., ) (with variants from the Latin edition of ), Pt. II, Chap. xviii, , p. .
. Standard & Poor’s long-term issuer ratings, for example, include AAA (‘ extremely strong’ capacity
to repay); AA (‘ very strong’); A (‘ strong’); BBB (‘ adequate’); BB (‘ less vulnerable’); B (‘ more
vulnerable’); CCC (‘ currently vulnerable’); CC (‘ currently highly-vulnerable’); R (‘ under regulatory
supervision’); SD (‘ selective default’); D (‘ default’); and NR (‘ not rated’). Ratings of BB and below
are considered non-investment grade, or ‘ speculative’ grade (S&P ).
. Several SEC Commissioners expressed desire for greater regulatory oversight of credit rating
agencies, bemoaning the current lack of statutory authority (Goldschmid ; Atkins ;
Glassman ), and Chairman Donaldson later told the Senate Banking Committee that if
Congress wanted more than the voluntary framework sought by the NRSROs, it would have to
provide such oversight authority (Donaldson b).
. Standard & Poor’s fees have been estimated at U.S.$, to U.S.$,, ‘ with the usual fee
amount being .% of the face amount of the issue’ for corporate debt issues, while ‘ Moody’s
typical charges were understood in  to be approximately – basis points . . . on the issue
amount, with a minimum of $, and a maximum of $, (except for complex issues where
the charges could run considerably more)’, and with ‘ some discounts . . . available for large, multiple
issuers’ (Smith and Walter , ).
. See, for example, Partnoy (, ) on the use of spreads; Cantor and Packer () on identifying
certain economic variables closely associated with sovereign credit ratings; and Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz
() on the possibility of measuring the performance of sovereign credit ratings before and after the
Asian financial crisis against a specified set of ‘ economic fundamentals’.
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. This is not to suggest that the agencies would not seek to characterize this proposal as an
impermissible intrusion on their activities. However, the agencies may come to see this proposal as
the least unattractive among the variety of regulatory activities currently being discussed.
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